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NOTES
Constitutional Law: First Amendment Rights:
Goodbye to Free Student Press?
The Supreme Court began 1988 with a bang rather than a whimper. On
January 13, 1988, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,I the Court pro-
tected a Missouri high school principal's action to censor the school's student
newspaper. The Court held that the school newspaper in this particular case
could not be characterized as a public forum and, hence, the school officials
could regulate the paper's contents in any reasonable manner.2 Here, deletion
of two full pages from the newspaper, because an article on teenage preg-
nancy and an article on divorce were considered inappropriate and sensitive,
was deemed reasonable.3
There are three keys to understanding the Court's decision in Hazelwood.
First, the Court emphasized the pedagogical interest in shielding the high school
audience from sensitive topics. Second, the Court characterized the school
newspaper as an integral part of the educational curriculum rather than a
public forum for student expression. Finally, the Court distinguished between
personal and school-sponsored speech, granting greater editorial control over
school-sponsored expressive activities. Each of these three "excuses" justified
the Court's application of the rational basis test, allowing the Court to abandon
the heightened scrutiny test outlined in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.4
Although it may be reasonable to assume that the Court simply executed
upon the pervasive national desire to "crack down" on student discipline,
the Court appears to have chosen a factually weak case to implement this
policy. First, even if school officials have a legitimate interest in shielding
high school students from potentially sensitive topics, the subject matter of
the two censored articles was simply not objectionable. Further, as this note
will illustrate, the legal determination as to what is or is not a public forum
is arbitrary and highly subjective, and yet that very determination identifies
the extent of students' first amendment rights. As the history of Hazelwood
itself shows, either determination can be adequately justified by different
courts, leaving the nation with an amorphous line of demarcation between
free student speech and censorship. Finally, the Court's distinction between
personal and school-sponsored speech is both unnecessary and unprecedented.
Rather, it is an additional pretext for avoiding the application of Tinker and
for applying the rubber stamp rational basis test.
1. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
2. Id. at 572.
3. Id.
4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (prohibition against students' wearing black armbands to protest
U.S. government policy in Vietnam violated first amendment because of no evidence the conduct
substantially or materially interfered with school classwork or discipline, or invaded rights of others).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
The Bumpy Road to Censorship
On May 13, 1983, the principal of Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis
County, Missouri, deleted two pages of Spectrum, the school newspaper. He
contended the stories involving pregnant students and divorce were inap-
propriate, sensitive, and would invade the privacy rights of others. Three
former Hazelwood students who were staff members of Spectrum filed a first
amendment action seeking injunctive relief, money damages, and a declara-
tion that their first amendment rights were violated by the censorship of the
articles.
The district court denied injunctive relief and held that the newspaper was
an integral part of the school's curriculum, rather than a public forum for
free expression by students.5 The court further held that the students' first
amendment rights were not violated because "school officials have a great
deal of discretion in the realm of curriculum.
' 6
As an integral part of the school's curriculum, school officials have signifi-
cant discretion in regulating the newspaper as long as their actions are legitimate
and reasonable.' The court held that the deletion, under a belief that the stories
involving pregnant students and divorce would result in an invasion of privacy,
was legitimate and reasonable.' In other words, simply a "belief" that so-
meone's privacy may be invaded is adequate justification for censorship as
long as a public forum is not involved.
The district court correctly acknowledged that this public forum/curriculum
distinction is the crucial factor for ultimately determining students' first amend-
ment rights. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and held
that the newspaper was a public forum for student expression because it was
"intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." 9 The Eighth
Circuit emphasized that Spectrum was not just a class exercise in which students
learned to prepare papers and hone writing skills. The newspaper was recog-
nized as a public forum, established to give students an opportunity to ex-
press their views to the entire student body freely, and to the public."° Finally,
5. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (E.D. Mo. 1985). The
court enumerated a long list of facts supporting its conclusion that Spectrum was part of the
school's curriculum.
6. Id. at 1467.
7. In the context of school-sponsored programs, school officials still must demonstrate that
there was a reasonable basis for the action taken, based on the facts before them at the time
of the conduct in question. See, e.g., Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(school officials properly prevented publication of letter in official school newspaper that would
result in substantial disruption of school).
8. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1467.
9. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986).
10. Id. at 1373. See also Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.
1977) (high school newspaper, produced by students in a journalism class, deemed a free speech
forum because it was conceived, established and operated as a conduit for student expression
on a wide variety of topics); Note, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools-
Fraser v. Bethel School District Revisited, 39 OKLA. L. Ray. 473 (1986) (secondary public school




as a public forum, school officials were precluded from censoring its contents
except upon demonstrating that the prohibition was "necessary to avoid
material and substantial interference with school work or discipline ...or
the rights of others.""II Hence, the Eighth Circuit triggered Tinker s heightened
scrutiny test by finding Spectrum to be a public forum.
Applying Tinker, the Eighth Circuit observed there was "no evidence in
the record that the principal could have reasonably forecast that the censored
articles or any materials in the censored articles would have materially disrupted
classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the school."' 2 Moreover,
the court recognized that no such claim was made on appeal."
However, the court admitted the school officials were entitled to censor
the articles on the ground they invaded the rights of others, but it argued
that "[v]ery few courts have defined the parameters of 'invasion of the rights
of others'.' ' 4 The court, persuaded by a law review student note's analysis, 5
concluded that "invasion of the rights of others" must refer only to a tor-
tious act." Hence, "school officials are justified in limiting student speech
under this standard only when publication of that speech could result in tort
liability for the school."' 1 The court emphasized that "[a]ny yardstick less
exacting than potential tort liability could result in school officials curtailing
speech at the slightest fear of disturbance.""
The Eighth Circuit concluded that no tort action for libel or invasion of
privacy could have been maintained against the school by the subjects of the
two articles or by their families.' 9 First, all names used in both the divorce
and pregnancy articles were fictitious, and each of the students was informed
11. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). See Note, Tinkering With High School Press: Kuhlmeier v.
Hazelwood School District, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1199 (1988) (tracing the evolution of students'
first amendment rights in the area of student expression and examining criteria courts have used
to distinguish between student publication as an integral part of curriculum and public forum);
Note, Public Forum Analysis and State Owned Publications: Beyond Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School District, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 241 (1987) (proposing test to remedy the confusion as
to what circumstances categorize a state publication as public forum).
12. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375.
13. Id.
14. Id. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (distribution to students of
sex questionnaire invaded rights of others).
However, at least one lav review note suggests that "invasion of the rights of others" must
refer only to a tortious act. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 625, 640 (1984). The Eighth Circuit in Kuhlmeier was persuaded by the note's argument
that: "Limiting school action under the invasion-of-rights justification to torts or potential torts
means that a school can refer to previously defined legal standards to decide if it may constitu-
tionally restrain student expression." Id. at 641. The Eighth Circuit agreed that school officials
are justified in limiting student speech, under this standard, only when publication of that speech
could result in tort liability for the school.
15. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, supra note 14, at 640-41.
16. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375.
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that their names would not be revealed.20 Second, the authors of both articles
obtained the consent of the students quoted but did not obtain the consent
of the boyfriends and parents who were merely mentioned, not quoted, in
the pregnancy article.2' Accordingly, the only tort action that conceivably could
have been brought against the school would have been one for invasion of
privacy by the parents or boyfriends of the girls in the pregnancy article.22
Because the pregnancy article did not expose any details of the parents' lives,
and because the fathers could only be identified by persons who previously
had knowledge of the revealed facts, no tort action could have been main-
tained. 23 Therefore, according to the Eighth Circuit, the school officials violated
the students' first amendment rights by censoring two pages of the newspaper.
Circuit Judge Wollman, dissenting, agreed with the district court that Spec-
trum was not primarily a public forum.2" Judge Wollman acknowledged that
Spectrum "may have constituted a vehicle for the expression of student view-
points," but such role was "incidental to its primary purpose of giving students
a hands-on opportunity to put their theory into practice." 2 Judge Wollman's
admission is evidence that the so-called line between public forum and cur-
riculum is anything but bright. In fact, his use of the seemingly innocuous
word "primary" illustrates that the process of defining this line is far from
absolute. Rather, it is a subjective balancing of a laundry list of factors with
the longest list winning.
Finally, Judge Wollman pitted students' first amendment rights against
deference to school administrators. He candidly acknowledged that the
Hazelwood East school officials may have acted "out of a too abundant sense
of caution," but remarked that such "caution" is well within the school of-
ficials' purview. 26 As such, he argued the court should grant the school of-
ficials "the deference due them."1
2 7
Such deference, particularly in the face of admitted fallibility, is not only




23. Id. This tort includes "publicity, of a highly objectionable kind, given to private infor-
mation about the plaintiff even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation." W.
PROSSER & W. KEATON, TORTS 809 (4th ed. 1971). The American Bar Association's Juvenile
Justice Standards Project Relating to Schools and Education would permit restriction of student
expression that "is violative of another person's right of privacy by publicity exposing details
of such person's life, the exposure of which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities." STANDARS RELATING TO SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 84 (1982).
24. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1378.
25. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Wollman relied on Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d
Cir. 1981), in holding that school officials may constitutionally decline to publish certain articles
for fear of the consequences those articles may engender. In Seyfried, the production of a school
play having graphic sexual content was halted by school officials. The court held the play was
an integral part of the school's educational program and that participation in the play "was
considered a part of the curriculum in the theater arts." Id. at 216. As such, deference is granted
the school officials. Id.





ly afforded school officials, courts must be both willing and able to intervene
when that discretion is abused. As the dissent in Hazelwood acknowledged,
the Court has traditionally reserved the daily operation of school systems to
the states and their local school boards.2" However, the dissent stressed that
the Court has not hesitated to intervene where the school's decisions run afoul
of the Constitution.
29
The Three Keys to Hazelwood
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in a five-to-
three decision. The Court concluded that the students' first amendment rights
had not been violated by the deletion of two pages from the school newspaper.
The Supreme Court held that the school officials exercised reasonable editorial
control over the newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism cur-
riculum." Both the majority and the dissent in Hazelwood marshalled a
methodical process of analysis. This case can be best understood by follow-
ing that process of analysis because the same process-the same analysis-led
to entirely contrary results.
First Amendment Rights of Adults Versus Students
Powerfully, the majority underscored that "[situdents in the public schools
do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate'. ' 31 However, in its next breath, the Court severely
limited these constitutional rights. The constitutional rights of students in the
public schools "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings, "32 and "must be applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment. ' 3 The natural repercussions of the Hazelwood
decision, however, are that the first amendment rights of students in the public
schools are minimal at best. In fact, their first amendment rights are extreme-
ly fragile. They are precariously placed in the hands of school administrators,
28. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 574, citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982).
29. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 574. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987)
(striking state statute that forbade teaching of evolution in public school unless accompanied
by instruction on theory of "creation science"); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(school board may not remove books from library shelves merely because it disapproves of ideas
they express); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking state law prohibition against
teaching Darwinian theory of evolution in public school); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (public school may not compel student to salute flag); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public or private
schools is unconstitutional).
30. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (majority opinion by Justice
White, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia joined;
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined).
31. Id. at 567, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
32. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (school district acted
entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon student in response to his
offensively lewd and indecent speech).
33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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teachers, and counselors who rarely have the legal ability to hold them, nur-
ture them, or protect them when necessary.
Moreover, although a school need not tolerate student speech that is incon-
sistent with its "basic educational mission," '3 ' the two full pages of articles
excised from Spectrum were hardly inconsistent with Hazelwood East's educa-
tional mission. As the dissent noted, the school board itself affirmatively
guaranteed the students of Journalism II an atmosphere conducive to foster-
ing such an appreciation and exercising the full panoply of rights associated
with a free student press. 35 Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 vowed
"[s]chool sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or
diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism." 36
More important, as the dissent emphasized, free student expression un-
doubtedly sometimes interferes with the effectiveness of the school's
pedagogical functions. 31 In fact, some student expression may interfere directly,
by preventing the school from pursuing its educational mission. However,
34. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
35. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 573.
36. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1455-56. The Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 is en-
titled "School Sponsored Publications" and provides as follows:
School sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or diverse
viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism. School sponsored publica-
tions are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications
and regular classroom activities.
Students who are not in the publications classes may submit material for con-
sideration according to the following conditions:
a. All material must be signed.
b. The material will be evaluated by an editorial review board of students from
the publications classes.
c. A faculty-student review board composed of the principal, publications teacher,
two other classroom teachers and two publications students will evaluate the
recommendations of the student editorial board. Their decision will be final.
No material shall be considered suitable for publication in student publications that
is commercial, obscene, libelous, defaming to character, advocating racial or religious
prejudice, or contributing to the interruption of the educational process.
37. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 574. For example, some brands of student expression directly
prevent the school from pursuing its pedagogical mission:
The young polemic who stands on a soapbox during calculus class to deliver an
eloquent political diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of calculus. And
the student who delivers a lewd endorsement of a student-government candidate
might so extremely distract an impressionable high school audience as to interfere
with the orderly operation of the school .... Other student speech, however,
frustrates the school's legitimate pedagogical purposes merely by epressing a message
that conflicts with the school's, without directly interfering with the school's ex-
pression of its message: A student who responds to a political science teacher's
question with the retort, "Socialism is good," subverts the school's inculcation
of the message that capitalism is better. Even the maverick who sits in class passively
sporting a symbol of protest against a government policy, [citations omitted] or
the gossip who sits in the student commons swapping stories of sexual escapade






other student speech merely frustrates the school's legitimate pedagogical pur-
poses by expressing a message that conflicts with the school's message, without
directly intefering with the school's expression of its message. .' Here, Spec-
trum may have conveyed a moral position at odds with the school's official
stance, but mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message can-
not be a constitutionally sufficient justification for censorship of student
speech. If such were justified, as the dissent recognized, our public schools
may be converted into " 'enclaves of totalitarianism' -39 that " 'strangle the
free mind at its source'. '"40 Instead, the first amendment permits no such
blanket censorship authority, and public educators must accommodate some
student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that con-
tradict those the school wishes to inculcate.
4
1
The majority in Hazelwood cited Bethel School District v. Fraser as authority
for the proposition that a school need not tolerate student speech that is in-
consistent with its basic educational mission.42 However, Hazelwood is easily
distinguished from Fraser. In Fraser, the Supreme Court held that a student
could be disciplined for having delivered a speech at an official school assembly
that was "sexually explicit" but not legally obscene. The school was entitled
to disassociate itself from the speech in a manner that would demonstrate
to others that such vulgarity was "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental
values' of public school education.
' 4 3
It is easy to agree with the Court that a student's continual and vulgar
sexual innuendo throughout a school assembly is inconsistent with a school's
basic educational mission. The students in Fraser were a captive audience as
they were required to attend the assembly and obviously could not avoid hear-
ing the vulgarity. However, it is particularly difficult to imagine how the two
innocuous articles involved in Hazelwood were "inconsistent," either directly
or indirectly. In fact, the district court specifically found that the principal
"did not, as a matter of principle, oppose discussion of said topi[c] in Spec-
trum."14" Further, the principal approved the" 'squeal law' article on the same
page, dealing forthrightly with 'teenage sexuality', 'the use of contraceptives
by teenagers', and 'teenage pregnancy'. ' ' " The two articles should have been
equally inconsistent with the school's mission and, hence, both censored.
38. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. 108 S. Ct. at 574, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
40. Id., quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
41. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 574-75.
42. Id. at 567.
43. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
44. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1467. The court stated that the principal's objections legitimately
went to the manner in which two of the topics were handled.
45. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 579. The dissent noted that "[i]f topic sensitivity were the
true basis of the principal's decision, the two articles should have been equally objectionable."
Further, "[it is much more likely that the objectionable article was objectionable because of
the viewpoint it expressed: It might have been read (as the majority apparently does) to advocate
'irresponsible sex'." Id.
1989]
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Finally, the Court held that educators must be afforded the authority to
shield immature high school students from exposure to "potentially sensitive
topics" (like "the particulars of teenage sexual activity") or unacceptable social
viewpoints (like the advocacy of "irresponsible sex or conduct otherwise in-
consistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order' 1).46 The ma-
jority held the principal had a legitimate pedagogical interest in shielding an
impressionable high school audience from material whose substance was "un-




Conversely, the dissent correctly attacked this proposition as illegitimate,
stating:
Tinker teaches us that the state educator's undeniable, and
undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political values
is not a general warrant to act as "thought police" stifling discus-
sion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the
official position .... Even in its capacity as educator the State
may not assume an "Orwellian guardianship of the public mind."
'4 8
Furthermore, the dissent characterized "potential topic sensitivity" as a
"vaporous nonstandard ... that invites manipulation to achieve ends that
cannot permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint discrimination and
chills student speech to which school officials might not object." ' 49 Because
of these dangers, the dissent argued that the Court has consistently condemned




Consistent with the dissent's argument, the Court camouflaged viewpoint
discrimination as protection of students from sensitive topics. The Court
claimed it upheld the principal's censorship of one of the articles because of
the potential sensitivity of "teenage sexual activity." 5' Yet, the district court
specifically found that the principal did not oppose discussion of such a topic
in Spectrum.2 Furthermore, as stated above, the principal did not oppose
a similar "squeal law" article also dealing with teenage sexuality. Therefore,
potential topic sensitivity is both an illegitimate and unfounded rationale.
Public Forum Versus Integral Part of School Curriculum
The determination as to whether a particular student activity is an integral
part of the school curriculum or a public forum for student expression is critical
to the outcome of this first amendment case. That determination triggers the
appropriate constitutional standard (either minimum rationality or some level
46. Id. at 570.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 577, quoting in part Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945).
49. 108 S. Ct. at 578.
50. Id. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Cox v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322-24 (1958).
51. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 570.




of heightened scrutiny) to be applied. Such determination, although critical,
is often extremely arbitrary and highly subjective. Hazelwood is a prime ex-
ample of this subjectivity because both sides are able to marshall facts suffi-
cient to support their respective positions. In essence, then, this determina-
tion is artificial, resembling not much more than a legal game of ping-pong.
For example, the district court found curriculum; the appellate court found
public forum; and the Supreme Court found curriculum. We are left to
speculate what might happen if there were another opportunity for appeal.
The majority in Hazelwood held that the student newspaper, Spectrum,
could not appropriately be characterized as a forum for public expression.
53
The Court noted that "public schools do not possess all the attributes of streets,
parks, and other traditional public forums that. . . 'have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions'." 5 Therefore, the Court emphasized that school facilities
are public forums only if school authorities have " 'by policy or by practice'
opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public', or by
some segment of the public, such as student organizations." 55 The Court
warned, however, that if the facilities have instead been reserved for other
intended purposes, "communicative or otherwise," then a public forum has
not been created, "and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions
on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school com-
munity." 56
The Court identified a laundry list of facts supporting its conclusion that
Spectrum was not a public forum for student expression, namely: (1)
Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 provided that "[s]chool sponsored
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational
implications in regular classroom activities"; (2) the Hazelwood East Cur-
riculum Guide described the Journalism II course as a "laboratory situation
in which the students publish the school newspaper applying skills they have
learned in Journalism I"; (3) Journalism II was taught by a faculty member
during regular class hours, and students received grades and academic credit
for the course; (4) the district court found that the journalism teacher " 'both
had the authority to exercise and in fact exercised a great deal of control
over Spectrum' "; and, (5) a decision to teach leadership skills in the context
of a classroom activity hardly implies a decision to relinquish school control
over that activity.57
53. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
54. Id. at 567-68.
55. Id. at 568, quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
56. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 568.
57. Id. The Court admitted that "the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in find-
ing Spectrum to be a public forum ... is equivocal at best." Id. (emphasis added). By this,
the Court implied that some evidence existed supporting the conclusion that Spectrum was a
public forum. However, the Court emphasized that "the evidence relied upon by the Court of
Appeals fails to demonstrate the 'clear intent to create a public forum'." Id. at 569, quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
19891
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In sum, the Court concluded the school officials did not evince either by
policy or by practice any intent to open Spectrum to " 'indiscriminate use'
by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally.""II Fur-
ther, the Court noted that the evidence relied upon by the Eighth Circuit failed
to demonstrate a "clear intent to create a public forum" as required by
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc." Rather, the
Court believed the school officials " 'reserve[d] the forum for its intended
purpos[e]' as a supervised learning experience for journalism students."0 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that school officials were entitled to regulate the
contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner because the minimum ra-
tionality standard governs rather than the Tinker standard, which applies only
to public forums.
61
The dissent in Hazelwood characterized Spectrum as a "forum established
to give students an opportunity to express their views while gaining an ap-
preciation of their rights and responsibilities under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution." ' 62 The dissent (and the Eighth Circuit) mar-
shalled their laundry list of facts supporting their contention that Spectrum
was indeed a public forum, namely: (1) the Statement of Policy of Spectrum
stated that "Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights im-
plied by the first amendment"; (2) Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51
stated that "[sichool sponsored student publications will not restrict free ex-
pression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism;"
(3) the students exercised great control over the production, management, and
content of the newspaper; (4) Spectrum covered topics of general interest to
the student body and was distributed to both the school and the public; and,
(5) a non-bylined editorial 63 printed in the January 14, 1980 issue, entitled
"The Right to Write," explained that Spectrum was the sole press of the stu-
dent body and as such, had a responsibility to be fair and unbiased in report-
ing, to point out injustice, to guard student freedoms, and to uphold a high
level of journalistic excellence. 6" Therefore, the dissent concluded that Spec-
trum was a public forum for student expression and, as such, the majority
incorrectly abandoned the Tinker standard. 65
The ability of both sides' to sift through the multitudinous facts, to selec-
tively articulate those facts particularly advantageous to their position, to claim
that position, and then to decide the case based upon that claimed position
58. 108 S. Ct. at 569, quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47.
59. 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
60. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 569, quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46,
61. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
62. Id. at 573, quoting Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1373.
63. The Spectrum Statement of Policy clearly expresses that "[all! non-by-lined editorials
appearing in this newspaper reflect the opinions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessarily
shared by the administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East. All by-lined editorials reflect only
the opinions of the writer." Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1372 n.3.
64. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 573-74; Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1371-73.




is quite unsettling. Certainly Hazelwood illustrates that any line of demarca-
tion between public forum and school curriculum is highly subjective if not
entirely arbitrary, particularly in this case where the facts are anything but
conclusive. Therefore, the Court chose a factually weak case in which to
establish precedent and set policy. By doing so, it has left the door wide open
to persuasive criticism.
School-Sponsored Versus Personal Speech
By categorizing the two newspaper articles as "school-sponsored" speech,"
the majority in Hazelwood again avoided application of the Tinker standard.
The Court argued that the standard for determining when a school may punish
student expression is not the same as the standard for determining when a
school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of stu-
dent expression. 6 The Court distinguished between "tolerating" particular
student speech (i.e., a student's personal expression that happens to occur
on the school premises) and a school affirmatively "promoting" particular
student speech (i.e., an educator's authority over school-sponsored publica-
tions, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school).68
According to the majority, this latter "school-sponsored" speech may be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether it occurs in a tradi-
tional classroom setting, so long as there is supervision by faculty members,
and the activity is designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to stu-
dent participants and audiences.69 As part of the school curriculum, educators
are entitled to exercise greater control over this form of student expression.
Educators can disassociate themselves from speech that not only substantially
interferes with classwork or impinges upon the rights of others, but that also
is ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.
7 0
The dissent criticized the majority for creating this distinction between per-
sonal and school-sponsored speech, emphasizing it could not be discerned from
66. Id. at 569. The Court distinguished the issue in Hazelwood from the issue in Tinker.
It stated:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular
student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different from the
question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote
particular student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence
a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.
Id.
67. Id. at 570.
68. Id. at 569.
69. Id. at 570.
70. Id. at 570.
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precedent."' The dissent argued that the Tinker test is appropriately applied
to both kinds of speech, and in the past, the Court has so applied Tinker.
72
For example, the dissent contended that the Court applied Tinker during the
previous term in Fraser, upholding an official decision to discipline a student
for delivering a lewd speech in support of a student-government candidate
during a student assembly.73 As the dissent aptly pointed out, if ever a forum
for student expression was "school-sponsored," Fraser's was: "Fraser...
delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office.
Approximately 600 high school students... attended the assembly. Students
were required to attend the assembly or to report to study hall. The assembly
was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government." 7"
Likewise, the dissent argued that Tinker should be applied to Hazelwood,
whether involving personal or school-sponsored speech. 7" Such distinction,
which the majority found dispositive, is, according to the dissent, merely one
of "an obscure tangle of three excuses" offered by them to avoid Tinker.
7 6
The dissent stressed that under Tinker, a school may "constitutionally punish
a budding political orator if he disrupts calculus class but not if he holds
his tongue for the cafeteria." 7 7 This is not because a more stringent standard
applies in the curricular context, but because student speech in the noncur-




It is important to note, however, that the majority in Hazelwood claimed
that the Court did not apply the Tinker standard in Fraser. In fact, the Court
throughout Fraser was careful to distinguish Tinker from the facts and cir-
cumstances involved."' Even though the Fraser Court apparently distinguished
Tinker, purported not to apply it, and was careful not to use the magic "disrup-
tion" language contained in Tinker, the Court did hold Fraser's conduct
violative of the first amendment essentially because it was "disruptive." 80
Therefore, the dissent's attack on the majority's distinction between personal
and school-sponsored speech in Hazelwood has more credibility than the
majority admitted.
The dissent also emphasized that the Court need not abandon Tinker to
constitutionally censor poor grammar, writing, or research because to reward
71. Id. at 575.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id., quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added).
75. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 576.
76. Id.
77. Id. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 576.
79. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-86 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White, Powell, Rehnquist
and O'Connor, JJ.).
80. See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("The schools, as instrument of the state, may
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school




such expression would materially disrupt the newspaper's curricular purpose-
to teach.81 However, censorship motivated by a desire to shield the audience
or disassociate the sponsor from the expression cannot legitimately serve the
curricular purpose of a student newspaper. The purpose of a school newspaper
is not to teach students that the press ought never report bad news, express
unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors. In essence,
then, the dissent argued that the application of Tinker would adequately and
effectively deal with the concerns of the majority, and abandonment of Tinker
was not only unnecessary but unprecedented.
Application of the Respective Judicial Standards
Because the majority in Hazelwood justified abandonment of the Tinker
standard, it applied the constitutional rubber stamp known as "rational basis"
or "minimum rationality. '8 2 Under this standard, as long as the school of-
ficials' decision to delete two full pages of the newspaper was "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," the action was constitutional. 83
Because the principal believed the students' anonymity was not adequately
protected in the pregnancy article, and because he believed the pregnancy ar-
ticle was not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students'
boyfriends and parents, it was not unreasonable for him to strike the pregnancy
article. Also, because the principal believed that a particular father might have
been identified in the divorce article, he did not unreasonably strike it from
publication.
In addition, the principal did not unreasonably delete two entire pages from
Spectrum even though only two articles were objectionable. He believed there
was no time to make changes in the articles, and he believed the newspaper
had to be printed immediately or not at all. In essence, each of the principal's
reasons for striking the pages is reasonable, and as such, no violation of the
students' first amendment rights occurred.
However, under the Tinker standard, the Court may not regulate student
expression that neither disrupts classwork nor invades the rights of others.
Any censorship that is not narrowly tailored to serve its purpose is a violation
of the first amendment prohibitions against censorship.84 The dissent argued
81. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 576. The dissent fully agreed with the majority that the "first
amendment should afford an educator the prerogative not to sponsor the publication of a newspaper
article that is ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, or
that falls short of the high standards for ... student speech that is disseminated under [the
school's] auspices'."
82. The origin of the rational basis test can be traced to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. See also Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(interstate commerce).
83. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
84. Id. at 573.
1989]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
that because the censorship served no legitimate pedagogical purpose, it could
not "by any stretch of the imagination have been designed to prevent
'material[] disrup[tion of] classwork'." 8 Further, the dissent argued that the
censorship was not necessary to prevent student expression from invading the
rights of others because the articles "could not conceivably be tortious, much
less criminal."
86
Perhaps most important, the dissent emphasized that even if the majority
were correct in holding that the principal could constitutionally censor the
objectionable material, the majority did so in a "brutal manner.' 87 The prin-
cipal excised six entire articles simply because he considered two articles ob-
jectionable. The dissent noted that the principal did not even inquire into
obvious alternatives, such as precise deletions or additions (one of which had
already been made), rearranging the layout, or delaying publication." Accord-
ing to the dissent: "Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is in-
tolerable from any state official. It is particularly insidious from one to whom
the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for
the cherished democratic liberties that our Constitution guarantees." 9
Therefore, the principal's conduct was not narrowly tailored to achievement
of his purported legitimate pedagogical interest and, hence, was
unconstitutional.
Finally, the dissent properly criticized the Court's purported reaffirmation
of Tinker's time-tested proposition that public school students " 'do not shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate'." 9' As the dissent highlighted, "[tihat is an ironic introduction to an
opinion that denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment
protection that Tinker itself prescribed." 9' On May 13, 1983, the students
at Hazelwood East did shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
85. Id. at 579, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
86. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 579.
87. Id. at 579-80. The dissent emphasized that "[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate
speech calls for more sensitive tools," and here, the principal used a paper shredder. See Keyishan
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
88. Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 580.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 580, quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
91. 108 S. Ct. at 580. The dissent stated:
Instead of "teachling] children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental
to the American system," Pico, 457 U.S. at 880, and "that our Constitution is
a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass," Shanley v. Northeast In-
dependent School District, 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972), the Court today
"teach[es] youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. The young men and women of Hazelwood
East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today.
Id. See also Comment, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Students' Constitutional Rights:
A Selective Analysis, 65 NEB. L. Rav. 161 (1986) (discussing the authoritarian trend of the Court




at the high school gate. The question remains whether they must do the same
at the university gate.92
Conclusion
Student journalism literally may be fighting for its life, if "life" includes
an opportunity for students to express themselves in a manner consistent with
the educational process. Such is the present state of affairs because this na-
tion seems satisfied with allowing students' first amendment rights to rest on
a subjective and nefarious public forum/curriculum determination. Once the
Court makes a nonpublic forum determination, it effectively rubber stamps
the school officials' decision to censor. Inquiries into the extent of such cen-
sorship are rarely meaningful because as long as the decision is reasonable,
the decision finds sanction with the Court.
Each and every school official has the ability to show a decision was
reasoned. Therefore, the Court urgently needs to develop more conclusive
public forum/curriculum guidelines, or to abandon such an approach altogether
and adopt a more principled standard for determining students' first amend-
ment rights. The Tinker standard is that more principled standard.
Furthermore, in Hazelwood, the Court's distinction between personal and
school-sponsored speech was merely a smokescreen designed to throw skep-
tics off the Tinker trail. It was not successful. As the dissent retaliated, such
distinction was both unprecedented and unnecessary.
Finally, the Court's concern with subjecting immature students to poten-
tially sensitive topics was far from legitimate. Even if legitimate, such con-
cern was misguided under the particular facts and circumstances of Hazelwood
because neither article could be considered objectionable.
Hazelwood obviously was a policy decision by the Supreme Court designed
to lay the heavy hand of authority on schoolchildren. This policy of heightened
student control and discipline may well be warranted and desired by the public.
However, a principled approach to law is preferential to allowing our highest
Court to establish precedent based solely on public desires.
Finally, as noted above, the majority in Hazelwood left open the issue
whether this precedent would apply at the college and university level. Left
to be seen is whether mature students will tolerate the application and im-
position of Hazelwood upon themselves. If the Supreme Court is in the habit
of deciding principles based upon public desire, it will follow the mature
students' free speech desire and the heightened standard articulated in Tinker
will prevail.
Deborah Jane Clarke
92. The majority claimed that it "need not now decide whether the same degree of deference
is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level." 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.7.
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